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THE MODAL UNITY OF ANSELM'S PROSLOGION1 
Gary Mar 
Anselm claimed that his Proslogion was a "single argument" sufficient to prove 
"that God truly exists," that God is "the supreme good requiring nothing else," 
as well as to prove "whatever we believe regarding the divine Being." In this 
paper we show how Anselm's argument in the Proslogion and in his Reply to 
Gaunilo can be reconstructed as a single argument. A logically elegant result is 
that the various stages of Anselm's argument are validated by standard axioms 
from contemporary modal logic. 
Anselm's prayerful meditation on the meaning of faith in the Proslogion was 
an attempt to find "one single argument ... that by itself would suffice to 
prove that God really exists, that He is the supreme good needing no other 
and is He whom all things have need of for their being and well-being, and 
also to prove whatever we believe about the Divine Being."2 Most contem-
porary philosophers, however, have narrowly focused on Proslogion II, and 
have consequently ignored Anselm's emphasis on a single argument in his 
work.3 In this paper I attempt to provide a logical map of Anselm's argu-
ment as a whole. I will not dwell on the assumptions about existence and 
predication in Pros log ion II, nor will 1 defend the soundness or cogency of 
that argument. Instead, I shall attempt to exhibit the logical relations 
among the stages of Anselm's broader "single argument" as it is progres-
sively developed in Proslogion I, II, 111 and the remaining chapters of the 
Proslogion, and as it is elaborated upon in Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo. 
I will show that these multiple passages reflect a single logically unified 
modal argument, a multi-faceted argument that reflects the beauty of a 
single gem. Anselm's claim of a single argument is vindicated by show-
ing that the conclusions of the various subsidiary arguments serve as the 
premises of a more comprehensive, unified, and sustained argument. 
Many philosophers have misconstrued Anselm's project as one of conjur-
ing the existence of God from the definition of God as a perfect being. My 
view, in contrast, is that Anselm was not trying to "define" God into exis-
tence but rather he was constructing, through the eyes of faith, a theology 
of God conceived of as a perfect being. A logically elegant result of our 
reconstruction is that the facets of Anselm's argument are validated by 
standard modal axioms drawn from contemporary modal logic. 
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I 
According to Anselm, the Proslogion was written " .. .from the point of 
view of someone trying to raise his mind to the contemplation of God, 
and seeking to understand what he believes.'" Anselm apparently 
wished to lead the sincere seeker to see the truth of the theism of faith 
and Scripture: 
Enter the inner chamber of thy mind; shut out all thoughts save 
that of God, and such as can aid thee in seeking him; close thy 
door and seek him. Speak now, my whole heart! Speak now to 
God, saying, I seek thy face; thy face, Lord, will I seek (Psalms 
xxvii. 8). And come thou now, 0 Lord my God, teach my heart 
where and how it may seek thee, where and how it may find 
thee. 
Lord, if thou are not here, where shall I seek thee, being absent? 
But if thou art everywhere, why do I not see thee present? Truly 
thou dwellest in unapproachable light. But where is unap-
proachable light, or how shall I come to it? Or who shall lead 
me to that light and into it, that I may see thee in it? Again, by 
what marks, under what form, shall I seek thee? I have never 
seen thee, 0 Lord, my God; I do not know thy form." 
Anselm's argument proceeds by drawing logical and theological 
implications from a definition of God as a being-than-which-a-greater-
cannot-be-thought.6 There are at least three initially plausible positions 
with regard to the conceivability of Anselm's God so defined. Notional 
theism is the view that the existence of a-being-than-which-a-greater-can-
not-be-thought is at least conceptually possible. Notional atheism denies 
this. The notional atheist is not making the modest claim (with which 
the notional theist can agree) that no human mind can adequately con-
ceive of God. Rather, the notional atheist is making the stronger posi-
tivistic claim that the very concept of a-being-than-which-a-greater-can-
not-be-thought is somehow conceptually incoherent or impossible. 
Notional agnosticism holds the thesis of symmetric conceivability: it is 
conceivable that a-being-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists 
but it is also conceivable that no such being exists. Using '<c>' to stand 
for conceptual possibility or conceivability, we may symbolize these 
three initial positions as follows: 
Notional Theism: <c>G It is conceptually possible that God exists. 
Notional Atheism: -<c>C It is conceptually impossible that God exists. 
Notional Agnosticism: <c>C A<C>-G It is conceptually possible that God exists, and 
It is conceptually possible that God does not exist. 
Our reconstruction of Anselm's argument will employ only proposi-
tional modal logic. The sentence letter 'G' abbreviates the proposition 
that 'God exists,' which in turn, is a stylistic abbreviation of the 
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Anselmian locution 'a-being-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought 
exists.' Some authors have claimed, on the basis of their reading of 
Anselm's remarks on modal predication, that Anselm could not pro-
pound the possibility of God's existing within his ontological argument 
without begging the question.7 These issues can be set aside for present 
purposes since our reconstruction is in propositional, and not in predi-
cate, modal logic. Any charitable reading of Anselm's propositional 
modal logic, however, would not entail the acceptance of the trivializing 
axiom that whatever is conceivably true must be actually true. 
In Chapter IX of his Reply to Gaunilo, Anselm offers a series of refutations 
of notional atheism: 
Whoever, then, denies the existence of a being than which a greater 
cannot be conceived, at least understands and conceives of the 
denial which he makes. But this denial he cannot understand or 
conceive of without its component terms; and a term of this state-
ment is a being than which a greater cannot be conceived. Whoever, 
then, makes this denial, understands and conceives of that than 
which a greater is inconceivable." 
Here Anselm claims that the Fool, in the very act of asserting the negative 
existential that God does not exist, presupposes the conceivability of God.9 
The Fool of Scripture (Ps. 14, Ps. 53) denies God because he is "cor-
rupt and [his] ways are vile." Even if the Fool claims not to have any 
knowledge of God at all, the question remains whether he honestly lacks 
this knowledge or whether he is repressing the knowledge he has. 
Scripture assures us that " ... what may be known about God is plain to 
them, because God has made it plain to them (Rom. 1:19, NIV)."l0 
Anselm's first attempt to refute notional atheism stakes its case on this 
truth of scripture: "Now my strongest argument that this [i.e., notional 
atheism] is false is to appeal to your faith and to your conscience." I I The 
verse following Romans 1 :19, in fact, provides the basis for another of 
Anselm's attacks on notional atheism in Chapter VIlI of his Reply to 
Gaunilo. In Romans 1 :20 (NIV) we read: " ... since the creation of the 
world God's invisible qualities-his eternal power and divine nature-
have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so 
that men are without excuse." 
If the Fool, for moral reasons, cannot get to the point where he can think 
the thought Anselm is proposing, Anselm proposes a way for the Fool to 
educate himself to recognize that he does have some grasp of God. Anselm 
argues that the visible goods provide us with a ladder, as it were, that 
allows us to conceive of ultimate goodness in the form of a-being-than-
which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought: 
For since everything that is less good is similar in so far as it is good 
to that which is more good, it is evident to every rational mind 
that, mounting from the less good to the more good we can from 
those things than which something greater can be thought conjec-
ture a great deal about that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-
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thought.... There is, then, a way by which one can form an idea of 
'that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought.' In this way, there-
fore, the Fool who does not accept the sacred authority [of 
Revelation] can easily be refuted if he denies that he can form an 
idea from other things of 'that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-
thought.'12 
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In the end, however, the Proslogion is addressed to sincere seekers. No 
one can truly seek what he believes to be logically incoherent. Let us 
assume, therefore, that Anselm's Fool is at least willing to abandon the 
disingenuous claim of notional atheism. 
Suppose next that the Fool decides to stake out his position on the sup-
posedly "neutral" ground of notional agnosticism. Recall this view maintains 
the thesis of symmetric conceivability: it is conceivable that a-being-than-
which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists but then again it is also conceiv-
able such a being does not exist. How does the notional agnostic fare? 
II 
Robert M. Adams 11971] discovered a modal ontological argument in 
Chapter I of Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo: 
For no one who denies or doubts that there is something-than-
which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought, denies or doubts that, if it were 
to exist, it would not be capable of not-existing either actually or in 
the mind-other-wise it would not be that-than-which-a-greater-
cannot-be-thought.1.1 
Adams paraphrases this pivotal premise as follows: 
(Even) if it is false that G, (still) if it were true that G, it would not be 
possible that not-Go 
Adam's paraphrase is counterfactual in form; nevertheless, he symbolizes 
the premise as an implication. If we follow Adams, we may symbolize 
this premise as [c](G >-<c>-G). Following Anselm, we can symbolize 
the counterfactual as (G D-+-O-G). Using the rules of modal negation 
and interchange of equivalents, these premises are logically equivalent to 
[c](G -*[c]G) and (G 0-> [c]G), respectively. The former states that it is 
conceptually necessary that if God exists then God's existence is concep-
tually necessary; the latter states that if it were the case that God exists, 
then it would be necessary that God exists. 
Adams used the Brouwersche system of modal logic to demonstrate that 
the former premise, together with the minimal premise of notional theism, 
validly implies that God exists. A parallel result can also be demonstrated 
for the counterfactual formulation. The Brouwersche system contains the 
characteristic axiom (B) <j)-+DO<j).14 Stated in terms of conceivability, (B) 
expresses the modal intuition that the actual state of affairs must at least be 
conceivable even if any other conceivable states of affairs had been actual 
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instead. For ease of exposition, we will use the Brouwersche axiom in an 
equivalent logically dual form: (BO) 0 LJ<p--+<p in giving a natural deduction 
version of Adam's reconstruction of Anselm's modal argument" 
l. 6ftewG 9, Direct Derivation 
2. [c](G-> [c]G) Premise 
3. <c>G Premise 
4. 6ftew <c>[c]G 7, Strict Derivation 
5. G Assume (Possibility Derivation) 
6. G --+ [c]G 2, Strict Importation (T) 
7. [c]G 5, 6, Modus Ponens 
8. <c>[c]G -~ G Axiom (BO) 
9. G 4,8, Modus Ponens 
To validate the more faithful counterfactual form of Anselm's argument, we 
supplement our logic with the inference rule of counterfactual possibility 
elimination: 
(CFPE) From (<p O--+\jf) and O<p , to infer O\jf . 
Eliminating lines (5)-(7) from the above derivation, we can obtain line (4) 
directly by CFPE. Anselm's derivation of philosophical theism from 
notional theism can, therefore, be validated within the Brouwersche sys-
tem of modallogic. '6 
Must the Fool capitulate in the face of Adams' modal reconstruction 
of Anselm's argument? No, the Fool can mount an atheistic version of 
the above modal argument from the premise that it is conceivable that 
God does not exist: <c>~G. The notional agnostic, it will be remem-
bered, holds a thesis of symmetrical conceivability: it is both conceivable 
that God exists and that God does not. From the second possibility, the 
Fool points out, we could have constructed an atheological argument 
instead. 
The Fool's atheological ontological argument is, in fact, conceptually 
simpler because it does not require axiom (B). All that is required is the 
weaker axiom (T), which is valid in all normal systems of lllodallogic: 
This axiom is captured in our system of natural deduction by the rule of 
necessity instantiation: 
(NI) From I J<p to infer <p 
Axiom (T) expresses the modal intuition that any conceptually necessary 
state of affairs is also actual. '7 
The Fool's atheological argument begins with Anselm's conceptual 
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truth and the notional agnostic's claim that the non-existence of God is 
also conceptually possible: 
1. Sftew~G 6, Direct Derivation 
2. [c](G -> [c]G) Premise 
3. <c>~G Premise 
4. G --+ [c]G 2, Necessity Instantiation 
5. ~[c]G 3, Modal Negation 
6. ~G 4,5, Modus Tollens 
Using a symmetrical conceivability premise, we can obtain the atheistic con-
clusion that God does not exist. The Fool, therefore, might attempt to adopt 
the "neutral" ground of notional agnosticism claiming an ultimate stale-
mate of symmetrically acceptable modal intuitions. 
But Anselm has an obvious reply. Anselm can accept the Fool's rea-
soning as modally impeccable. Anselm continues, moreover, to main-
tain that his former argument is modally impeccable as well. 
Combining these two branches of the argument, we have constructed a 
reductio ad absurdum of notional agnosticism. In this way, the two argu-
ments do not produce a conceptual stalemate, but instead provide a 
decisive refutation of notional agnosticism. Indeed, the denial of the 
refutation of notional atheism is logically equivalent by DeMorgan's law 
and laws of modal negation to [c]~Gv[c]G ,which states that God's 
existence is either conceptually impossible or conceptually necessary. 
The discovery that notional atheism is logically inconsistent given 
Anselm's premise is somewhat less surprising when we observe that 
Anselm's pivotal premise states, in effect, that if God exists at all then 
God's existence must be conceptually necessary. 
Anselm's argument thus far can be seen as leading the Fool from the 
darkness of atheism to the dusk of notional agnosticism. Anselm has 
shown notional agnosticism to be conceptually contradictory given an 
Anselmian conception of God who exists necessarily if at all. It is, of 
course, open for the notional agnostic to abandon his position and 
retreat even further into agnosticism. He might weaken his claim to the 
disjunction of notional theism and notional atheism, or he might decide 
to become a meta-notional agnostic who claims that he does not even 
know whether it is conceptually possible that God exists or whether it is 
conceptually possible that God does not. Anselm would, no doubt, 
question whether this sophisticated modal agnosticism is an honest 
expression of doubt or merely a hasty retreat from the deliverances of 
reason. 
Let us assume that the Fool is willing to concede the minimal assump-
tion of notional theism-that it is at least conceivable that a-being-than-
which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists. The stage has now been set 
for the argument of Proslogion II. Proslogion IT records Anselm's discov-
ery which came as a revelation to him one night. Anselm's biographer 
described Anselm's revelation in this way: 
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Behold, one night during Matins, the grace of God shone in his 
[Anselm's] heart and the matter became clear to his understanding, 
filling his whole heart with immense joy and jubilation.1g 
What was the occasion of Anselm's jubilation? 
III 
It was Anselm's discovery of his famous 'ontological argument' of 
Proslogioll TI. 19 As R. E. Allen has noted, the isolated argument of 
Proslogion 11 has itself either been regarded as a gem-or a paste-whose 
worth can be judged apart from its context. I have been suggesting, to 
the contrary, that focusing narrowly on Proslogion II-against Anselm's 
own admonitions-forces us to overlook the multi-faceted unity of 
Anselm's argument. 
Recall that the proof contained in Pros/ogion II purports to show that it 
is conceptually necessary that if a-being-than-which-a-greater-cannot-
be-thought exists in the understanding, then such a being must be con-
ceived to exist in reality, namely, that [c]«c>G--+G). This particular facet 
of Anselm's gem has been the focus of most contemporary logical scruti-
ny. Since the Proslogion II argument appears to depend on dubious doc-
trines about existence and predication, the Kantian question of whether 
'being' is a predicate, and so forth, has been the focus of an intense 
philosophical debate. Anselm, however, makes no use of these contro-
versial doctrines in Chapter I of his Reply to Gaulliio. Evidently he did not 
regard those assumptions as essential to his argument. 
The argument in Chapter I of Anselm's Reply goes like this: 
But, whatever can be thought as existing and does not actually 
exist, could, if it were to exist, possibly not exist either actually or in 
the mind. For this reason, if it can merely be thought, 'that-than-
which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought' cannot not exist.20 
Earlier in this chapter Anselm gives an argument for the same conclusion 
on the basis of the impossibility of God's beginning to exist in time: 
.. .if it [i.e., a-being-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought] can 
be thought it is necessary that it exists. For 'that-than-which-a-
greater-cannot-be-thought' cannot be thought save as being 
without a beginning. But whatever can be thought as existing 
and does not actually exist can be thought as having a beginning 
of its existence. Consequently, 'that-than-which-a-greater-can-
not-be-thought' cannot be thought as existing and not yet actu-
ally exist. If, therefore, it can be thought as existing, it exists of 
necessity.21 
Here premises regarding the impossibility of God's temporal beginnings 
appear in addition to those of the later argument. How could Anselm have 
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n;garded these as essentially the same argument? 
One way to understand Anselm's claim of a "single argument," I think, 
is as follows. Despite differences in content, these arguments can be shown 
to be instances of the same argument schema. The central premise of this 
argument schema is: 
But as to whatever can be conceived, but does not exist-if there 
were such a being, its non-existence, either in reality or in the 
understanding, would be possible.22 
Anselm appears to be claiming that there are conceptually necessary 
truths of the form: if God's existence is conceivable but God does not 
exist, then it is conceivable that ~1t, where ~1t is to be replaced by a sen-
tence stating that 'God is non-existent' or that God is in some other way 
contingent, imperfect, or lacking in goodness. This premise can be sym-
bolized schematically as follows: 
[Cl( <c>G 1\ ~G- ><c>~1t) . 
The next premise of the argument is that God, as a-being-than-
which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought, could not conceivably be contin-
gent or imperfect or lacking goodness, namely, [c 11t. Can we construct 
a valid modal argument from these premises leading to Anselm's con-
clusion that it is conceptually necessary that if it is conceivable that 
God exists, then God exists?23 
We can construct such an argument provided we have the modal 
axiom characteristic of (54) [J<p -~ D ~ [<p. Axiom (54), when applied 
to conceptual truths, expresses the intuition that conceptual necessity 
is itself a matter of conceptual necessity. The (54) axiom is valid in 
modal structures in which the accessibility relation is transitive. 
Transitivity would, of course, fail for notions of conceivability that are 
relative to possible worlds or to persons. These relative notions of 
conceivability, however, are certainly not Anselm's. Anselm's under-
standing of the traditional doctrines of God's omnipresence (as 
expressed in Psalm 139, for example) can be interpreted so as to 
exclude relative notions of this kind.24 
We intend to use the (54) axiom to validate Anselm's claim of the 
necessity of his derivation of philosophical theism from notional the-
ism. One fact that supports the appropriateness of (54) for this pur-
pose is that (54) is often adopted as an axiom in provability modal 
logics. In fact, (54) is derivable from the basic axiom of modal prov-
ability logics known as Lob's axiom. 2s Anselm's conclusion can now 
be derived in the (54) system of modal logic. Recall that the strict 
importation rule for (54) is repetition applied to statements of the 
form'D<p'. 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
5ftew [c]( <c>G---> G) 
[c]«c>G /\ -G--><c>-7t) 
[c] 7t 
5ftew [c]( <c>G---> G) 
~<c>G -->G 
<c>G 
~G 
-G 
<c>G/\ -G 
<c>G/\-G---> <c>-7t 
<c>-7t 
-[c] 7t 
[c]7t 
Faith and Philosophy 
4, Direct Derivation 
Premise 
Premise 
5, Strict Derivation 
7, Conditional Derivation 
Assume (CD) 
12, 13, Indirect Derivation 
Assume (ID) 
6, 8, Adjunction 
2, Strict Importation (T) 
9, 10, Modus Ponens 
11, Modal Negation 
3, Strict Importation (54) 
Using axiom (54), we have demonstrated that it is conceptually necessary 
that if notional theism is true then philosophical theism is also true. Anselm 
was right: we can derive philosophical theism from the minimal premise of 
notional theism. 
w 
Commentators have noted that the transition from the argument of 
Pros/ogion II to that of Proslogion III involves the transition from God's exis-
tence to God's necessary existence: a transition from philosophical theism to 
what we shall call modal theism. Anselm wants to demonstrate not only that 
God exists but that it is not even conceivable that God does not exisU6 The 
key passage is this: 
And certainly this being so truly exists that it cannot be even 
thought not to exist. For something can be thought to exist that 
cannot be thought not to exist, and this is greater than that which 
can be thought not to exist.... 
And You, Lord our God, are this being.... In fact, everything else 
there is, except You alone, can be thought of as not existing. You 
alone, then, of all things most truly exist and therefore of all things 
possess existence to the highest degree .... 27 
Anselm's demonstration of modal theism is the demonstration that the 
existence of God is conceptually necessary, or in Anselm's own words, that 
God cannot be conceived not to exist: -<c>-G. Anselm underscores the 
key premise that: 
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'" something can be thought to exist that cannot be thought not to 
exist.. .. 2s 
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which we may symbolize as <c>~<c>~G. Ignoring for the moment the logi-
cal details of this argument/" let's focus on the abstract pattern of Anselm's 
inference. Anselm infers that it is necessary that God exists from the 
premise that it is possible that it is necessary that God exists. Expressing 
this inference as a conditional, we have 
<c>~<c>~G-->~<c>~G. We can then simplify this conditional using the 
laws of modal negation to obtain: 
<c>[c]G->[c]G , 
which, intriguingly, is the logical dual for the characteristic modal axiom for 
(55) O<p---+OO<p. Therefore, axiom (55), at least when applied to the proposi-
tion that God exists, turns out to be precisely what is logically required to 
derive the modal theism of Proslogioll III from the derivation of philosophi-
cal theism of Proslogioll II. The (55) axiom turns out to be valid in modal 
structures in which the relation of accessibility is an equivalence relation. 
The strict importation rule for (55) is simply repetition applied to sentences 
of the form 'O<p'. 
1. 6ftew [c]G 12, Direct Derivation 
2. <c>G Premise (notional theism) 
3. [c]«c>G->G) Premise (Proslogion II) 
4. 6ftew [c]<c>G 2, Strict Derivation 
5. I <c>G I 2, Strict Importation for (55) 
6. 6ftew lc]<c>G- >[c]G 8, Conditional Derivation 
7. [c) <c>G Assume (CD) 
8. ~[c]G 11, Strict Derivation 
9. <c>G 7, Strict Importation (T) 
10. <c>G---+G 3, Strict Importation (T) 
11. G 10,9, Modus Ponens 
12. [c]G 6, 4, Modus Ponens 
Therefore, modal theism follows in (55) from the conceptual necessity of the 
logical derivation of philosophical theism from notional thesis, the conclu-
sion of the argument contained in Pros log ion IP' 
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v 
Having derived modal theism in Proslogion III, Anselm's derivations of 
the divine perfections in Chapters V-XXVI of the Proslogion are immediate 
consequences of conceptual truths of the form [c](G+--+n;), where n; is 
replaced by various statements expressing God's perfections. 
l. 5ftew [C]n; 4, Direct Derivation 
2. [c) (G+--+n;) Premise 
3. [c]G Premise (Proslogion 111) 
4. 5ftew [c]n; 7, Strict Derivation 
5. G<-+n; 2, Strict Importation (T) 
6. G 3, Strict Importation (T) 
7. n; 5, Biconditional! Conditional, 
6, Modus Ponens 
Notice that since necessity instantiation is used exclusively as a strict impor-
tation rule, the above derivation would be valid in a modal system having 
only the modal axiom (K). 
Anselm's strategy circumvents certain modern atheistic challenges to the 
coherence of theism. These atheistic challenges assume that the question of 
the coherence of theism is prior to the question of theism on the grounds 
that no amount of evidence can establish that an incoherent state of affairs 
obtains. These atheistic arguments proceed by attacking various formula-
tions of traditional divine attributes such as omnipotence or omniscience. 
Anselm's strategy avoids challenges of this sort by not committing itself to 
any specific philosophical proposal for understanding these divine attribut-
es. 
Instead, Anselm begins with a very minimal conception of divinity as a-
being-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought. Anselm then argues that 
certain divine perfections-whether or not we understand them properly 
and whether or not we can find adequate philosophical explications of 
them-are consequences of this conception. In so doing, Anselm rather 
than providing his own philosophical definitions of the divine attributes, 
relies on God's revelation in Scripture. In the case of a believer who is seek-
ing to understand, Anselm can rely on the work of the Holy Spirit to pro-
vide the seeker with a full assurance of the truths of faith (Rom. 8:14-15, 1 In. 
2:20,26-7; 3:24; 4:13; 5:7-10). "I do not endeavor, 0 Lord, to penetrate thy 
sublimity, for in no wise do I compare my understanding with that; but I 
long to understand in some degree thy truth, which my heart believes and 
loves. For I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe in 
order to understand. For this also I believe, that unless I believe, I should 
not understand ... "31 Moreover, Anselm is ever mindful that philosophical 
illumination has also been revealed by God's grace: "I thank thee, gracious 
Lord, I thank thee; because what I formerly believed by thy bounty, I now 
MODAL UNITY OF PROSOLOGlON 61 
so understand by thine illumination .... "32 
To summarize, our logical investigation has revealed a modal unity to 
Anselm's argument. The stages of reasoning form a multi-faceted argu-
ment that leads from notional theism to philosophical theism, from philo-
sophical theism to modal theism, and from modal theism to the theology of 
perfection as seen through the eyes of faith and Scripture. A logically ele-
gant result is that the facets of this gem are validated by standard modal 
axioms. The attempt to derive philosophical theism from notional theism is 
the project of ProslogionlI. This stage of Anselm's argument is validated by 
the modal axiom (B) of the Browersche system. In Chapter 1 of his Reply to 
Gaunilo, Anselm gives another demonstration that philosophical theism fol-
lows from notional theism assuming the necessity of divine perfections. 
This argument can be validated using the modal axiom characteristic of 
(54). The Proslogion III argument for modal theism, in turn, is validated 
using the modal axiom characteristic of (55) and the conceptual necessity of 
the previous derivations of philosophical theism from notional theism. The 
theology of perfection contained in Chapters V-XXVI of the Proslogion can 
then be derived from modal theism and the modal axiom (K) which is valid 
in all normal modal systems. In the diagram below, we summarize the 
stages of Anselm's argument together with their supporting modal axioms. 
The diagram takes the form of a diamond. This diamond is completed by 
the characteristic axiom of deontic modal logic, namely, (D) [el(() --+<c>(() , 
which licenses the deduction of the starting premise of the notional theism 
of Proslogion I from the modal theism derived in Proslogion 111 and employed 
in Chapter V-XXXVI. 
- (D) [el(()->O<p 
Perfect Being 
Theology: 
Chapter V-XXVI * 
(K) [c](G-rc) . [c]G:. [c]rc 
Notional Theism 
Chapter I 
* 
[el rc :. [ej«e>G-+G) 
* 
Modal Theism: [c]G 
Chapter III 
(B) r ej(G- >fcJG) . <e>G:. G 
or (G D-'fc]G) . <e>G:. G 
* 
Philosophical 
Theism: C 
Chapter 11, Reply 
to Gauni/o 
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The arrows in the above diagram represent logical implications, and the 
annotations in bold indicate the validating modal axiom for the various 
facets of Anselm's argument. Anselm's own joyful prayer alludes to the 
metaphor of a gem: 
"How great is that light in which everything true sparkles and 
which shines for the thinking mind! How vast is the truth in which 
there is only truth and outside of which there is only nothingness 
and the false. And how immeasurable the truth which in one 
glance sees everything that has been made; and sees by whom and 
through whom, and how all these things were made from nothing. 
What purity is there, what simplicity, what certitude and light-
someness is there? Surely it is more than can be understood by a 
creature."33 
How much does Anselm's argument prove? Anselm's argument has 
been misconstrued as an attempt to prove the metaphysical fact of God's 
ontological necessity from God's mere conceivability by "defining" a being 
into existence.'>! In this paper we have instead viewed Anselm's argument, 
as he himself claimed, as a sustained meditation upon God as a-being-than-
which-none-greater-can-be-conceived. Anselm was able to progressively 
deduce an ever richer set of philosophical and theological conclusions from 
his conception of God as a perfect being. Such a God, for example, must be 
conceived not only as existing but also as having necessary existence. 
Anselm encourages the philosophical pilgrim to meditate on the knowledge 
of God he already possesses (Rom. 1:19) and Anselm's argument leads the 
pilgrim far beyond the minimal conception of divinity envisaged by the 
notional theist. From the assumption of the conceivability of God as a-
being-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought, Anselm demonstrates not 
only that God exists and necessarily exists, but that God is perfect in every 
conceivable way. This perfection, understood in light of Scripture, entails 
that God is eternal, omnipresent, omnipotent, perfectly good and just, 
absolute, and necessarily self-existent?' 
Perhaps it was Anselm's hope that the pilgrim, captivated by the inter-
play of light reflected among the various facets of his argument, would be 
drawn to contemplate more deeply the source of this light itself. Anselm's 
argument provides a path for the pilgrim to escape from the utter darkness 
of atheism and the conceptual confusions of notional agnosticism and in so 
doing to behold a theological vision of the perfection of God as revealed in 
light of Scripture. What I have tried to show is that Anselm was right in 
regarding this path as essentially the path of a single argument. 
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